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Paradoxes of Property: 
Piracy and Sharing in Information Capitalism
Jonathan Paul Marshall and Francesca da Rimini
The concept of ‘property’ is inherently tangled in contradictions and 
disorders, especially within Information Capitalism where ideas and 
culture have to be restricted to make a profit, and shared in order to 
innovate. Marking out property as ‘private’ and ‘profitable’ means that it 
has to be separated from the social complex of its origin, so that this 
origin is both obscured and marked by the prospect of violence and theft. 
As David Hume and Pierre Joseph Proudhon suggest property is driven by 
imagination, metaphor, power, its contribution to symbolic identity, and 
throughout, by conflict over originality and copying. In Information 
Capitalism, the tools of ‘knowledge’ workers are the tools by which their 
creativity is appropriated, captured and displayed, and their access to 
property is acquired or retained for the uncertain future. In this situation 
the boundaries between property and piracy become even more 
ambiguous. This situation is explored through considering the social 
formations and activities around peer to peer file-sharing, and the court 
case involving The Pirate Bay, in which the roles of metaphor and the 
tension between property, survival and theft are clearly displayed. 
Introduction
All societies both suffer and benefit from levels of what is perceived as 
disorder, and the guiding principles of the society may be contradictory, or 
paradoxical, in that their ordering systems create disorder. Our aim in this text is 
explore the disorders and vagaries of property that seem essential to its continuance, 
construction and destruction, and then demonstrate how these paradoxes play out in 
the information economy in particular within the domain of peer-to-peer (P2P) file-
sharing. We do not wish to reduce these paradoxes and contradictions to a temporary 
error or to a future ordered synthesis, but to take them as they are in all their 
splintered fury. Much contemporary social action stems from these incoherencies, and 
the disputes, displays of power, and innovations which circle around them. In the P2P 
field the disorder generated by the order of property provides opportunities for new 
productive and adaptive social and technical forms of life to emerge. 
By contrasting order and disorder we are not implying the necessary existence 
of a binary distinction between the two, or that definitions of order and disorder will 
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not change depending on the social position of the definers. Disorder is not always 
and everywhere the same. It resists definition, which adds to its effects. 
The Incoherence of Property
Property and Imagination
Eighteenth century British philosopher David Hume argued that private 
property is both essential for social order, and imaginary. 
[D]isputes may not only arise concerning the real existence of property 
and possession, but also concerning their extent; and these disputes are 
often susceptible of no decision, or can be decided by no other faculty 
than the imagination (1888: 507).
Hume argues that property and its boundaries are constructed via metaphors which do 
not so much reflect ‘reality’ as they express the properties of the mind and social 
habit, and this causes problems with drawing ownership boundaries around property.
He illustrates this by a story of two Grecian colonies who heard of an 
abandoned city. Arriving at the same time, their official messengers began a race and, 
as one was slower than the other, he:
launch’d his spear at the gates of the city, and was so fortunate as to fix it 
there before the arrival of his companion. This produc’d a dispute betwixt 
the two colonies, which of them was the proprietor of the empty city; and 
this dispute still subsists among philosophers (1888: 507-8). 
The dispute is impossible to settle rationally because it depends upon claims made to 
the imagination about the attachment of the messengers to their cities, whether the 
race was to the gates or the wall, whether the spear forms better or equal contact to the 
hand, and whether, if the spear had not held, the claim would still count. 
For Hume, property is built from metaphor; it becomes a concretising rhetoric 
in action. There is no a priori to property, any example can be disputed, even though 
property is vital for social order. 
More conventionally, John Stuart Mill held that what a person owns as property 
depends on their own labour: ‘The foundation of the whole is the right of producers to 
what they themselves have produced’ (Mill 1909: 218). This implies that unequal 
distributions of property come about either because of a just agreement, or because 
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people give up the products of their labour, in exchange for survival. Mill recognises 
difficulties with his formulation, as he acknowledged the existence of appropriation 
and the difficulties of drawing a boundary line around people’s collaborative labour, 
but he largely put these difficulties aside (ibid: 219ff). Further complications arise 
when different groups differ about what activities and types of labour are valuable, 
and thus have different imaginings of the ‘just’ distribution of property. Property 
becomes political, and a matter of relative power. Disputes over imaginings may end 
up being resolved by force. As Adam Smith wrote:
Civil government, so far as it is instituted for the security of property, is in 
reality instituted for the defence of the rich against the poor, or of those 
who have some property against those who have none at all (1979 II: 
715).
Nineteenth century anarchist Pierre Joseph Proudhon pointed out that property 
is intrinsically theft (nd: 37ff.); not only because property is often appropriated from 
others by force, but also because something becomes property only if someone else 
can steal it. Property and theft give birth to each other. We can here instance the 
Marxist argument that capitalist systems of property were indirectly promoted when 
English aristocrats dispossessed peasants of their traditional land and commons, 
thieving it to make parks or to grow wool, and forcing a newly-pauperised class into 
the cities where they became cheap wage labour (Linebaugh & Rediker 2000). 
Through use of enclosure, aristocrats eventually undermined the feudal relationship 
with the peasantry, which was the basis of their power (Federici 2004).
Another example, this time unsuccessful, of how property/theft works through 
the appropriation of ‘common rights’, occurred when Bechtel Corporation in Bolivia, 
backed by the World Bank, attempted to criminalise the capture of rainwater by 
alleging that all water was its private property. Its claims were eventually abandoned 
due to public protest (Chatterjee 2003; ENS 2006). Similar laws exist in the US state 
of Colorado, where almost all water, even rain, is ‘owned’ by people who have 
bought rights to the waterways (Ingold 2009). Hence, ‘[p]reventing that water from 
reaching a river — and thus, its rights holder — is akin to stealing’ (ibid.). 
‘If you try to collect rainwater, well, that water really belongs to someone 
else,’ said Doug Kemper, executive director of the Colorado Water 
Congress. ‘We get into a very detailed accounting on every little drop’ 
(Riccardi 2009).
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Similarly, in 1995, the US Congress turned the resource of unused broadcasting 
frequencies into property, giving those frequencies to media corporations free of 
charge in perpetuity, thus initiating what Republican politician Bob Dole called ‘a 
giant corporate welfare program’ (Barnes 2006: 19). 
Cultural expression is also increasingly bounded. Before 1976, US copyright 
could last for a maximum of 56 years. The Act of 1976 extended that to the life of the 
author plus 50 years. An Act of 1998 extended that to life plus 70 years, or 75 years in 
total for ‘corporate authorship’. The US Congress’s ‘multibillion dollar allocation 
decision… ensured that virtually no creative works would enter the public domain 
over the following two decades’ (Tehranian 2007: 540). More recently, the United 
States government (in alliance with the entertainment industry) attempted to ‘bully’ 
Spain into adopting extreme anti-piracy measures, as part of a project of 
‘harmonisation’ which ‘continuously ratchet[s] up copyright protection, one country 
at a time’ (Hinze 2010; Anderson 2010). ‘Property’ held in common is being reduced, 
sometimes by stealth, supporting Adam Smith’s already mentioned claim that 
government exists to extend the reach of the property claims of those who already 
have. 
‘Normal Exchange’
A more anthropological way of conceiving property, connects property to what we 
will call ‘normal exchange’1. In this view humans, throughout their existence as a 
species, have primarily lived in hunter-gatherer, or slash and burn agricultural 
societies, where massively inequitable accumulation is rendered socially unlikely by 
mechanisms that prevent people from accumulating too much status or property. 
Property implies obligation. If your kin demand property off you, and you refuse, then 
you will be ostracised as a ‘thief’ – a person who does not acknowledge others. As 
well, in these societies, most goods rot and thus cannot be accumulated. If goods rot 
slowly, then accumulation is limited by what can be carried. Hence a limit to 
accumulation arises, and it becomes strategically better to give goods away to make, 
or reinforce, relationships and culture, and to build obligation, status or self-identity. 
As a result, property is nearly always in circulation. While these societies may have 
hierarchy (especially a gender and age hierarchy), what members can take or have at 
1 The writing on ‘traditional’ economics and its politics is enormous. General texts include: Mauss 
1997; Sahlins 1974; Clastres 1989; Wilk & Cligget 2007.
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the expense of others is limited, whilst in more hierarchical societies some people can 
violate this balance and accumulate property, without yielding it on demand, or giving 
it away in exchange and feasting. If we note Proudhon’s paradox that what enables 
society might also destroy it, and that the harm and abuse resulting from property 
cannot be dissevered from the good, this accumulation might be positive, as it allows 
people some independence from the group. Yet this anthropological view implies that 
we can expect that attempts to extend individual or corporate property at the expense 
of others, or at the expense of cultural expression, will meet resistance, and the 
hierarchical boundaries between theft and property will be contested. 
To summarise: Property is imagined, and arises out of a social-historical 
network of co-production, creation, distribution, conception and relations of power. It 
is difficult to extract bordered property from this network and impossible to give it a 
single cause without an act of socially-legitimated ‘theft’, backed by some others, 
which extracts it from its messy origins. Property has no eternal essence and no 
boundaries: it is a network, or process, involving the whole of social action. Things 
are constantly becoming-property and escaping being property, amidst conflict and 
decay. As Proudhon claims, ‘property is impossible’ (nd: 157ff).
Property, Copying and Culture
Property and Identity
Because property is so implicated in the imagination it can become a way that we 
imagine ourselves and our potencies2. We use property, words and ideas as tools to 
express ourselves and participate in social life. Property can give the rewards of, or 
help establish, class and status, which is why theft or loss might be so powerful; loss 
can represent a diminishment of personal existence. In some societies there may be no 
‘you’ outside of the display or exchange of property. Renunciation is not commonly 
available in information capitalism as, within its framework, it is primarily newly-
owned ‘things’ that promise fulfilment in a never-ending cycle of desire, display and 
consumption.
The role of property in constituting identity in information capitalism leads the 
consumer to conflicts. On the one hand, mass consumption provides something to 
share and discuss; experiences and items in common with others, in what may 
otherwise be a fractured life. However, in so doing, it also renders you the same as 
2 Basic writings on this subject include: Douglas 1996; Bourdieu 1985; Bauman 2007. 
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everyone else and thus undermines your valued ‘individuality’. In this set up, there is 
always the need for recognised distinction, although this does not include the 
distinction which arises from not having property; that is simply recognised as failure. 
When others buy or take the almost identical property, then you are threatened 
as they are effectively stealing your distinction and hence your ‘identity’. This can 
lead to a spiral of ever more intently keeping up with the new, and thus taking the risk 
of embracing something which does not become recognised, which is just ‘trash’. In 
that sense, identity becomes fashion, and people will try and embrace the latest as 
soon as it arrives and has a reasonable chance of being accepted and, like other forms 
of acquiring and producing culture, this often involves copying. Copying may be 
hindered if brand names (of clothing, cosmetics, hi-tech gadgets, etc) become a mark 
of authenticity or wealth or adequacy. However, in some groups the ability to thieve, 
or rip off, the latest, may be taken as evidence of identity factors of skill, status or 
having high-tech marketability. Even so, the thief, pirate, or counterfeiter will have to 
risk delaying long enough for it to be recognisable that he or she got it first; too soon 
and it’s worth nothing.
Copying and transformation are vital to imagination and hence property. 
Without copying there is no potential transformation, and no combining images and 
ideas into new images and ideas. As philosopher and religious scholar Rene Girard 
says: ‘there is nothing, or next to nothing, in human behaviour that is not learned, and 
all learning is based on imitation. If human beings suddenly ceased imitating, all 
forms of culture would vanish’ (1987: 7). Girard argues that imitation is ambivalent 
as, while we learn through emulation, if two people reach for the same thing, or the 
student supersedes the teacher, conflict easily arises. Consequently societies tend to 
be ambivalent about imitation, recognising also that it is a source of magical attack 
and vulnerability, as with the ‘voodoo doll’. Modern Western societies tend to 
officially regard over-zealous imitation as bad, with originality marking creativity, but 
it has not always been so.
Ambiguity and Poetics of Theft
Even under hierarchy we can point to ambivalences about theft. Some thieving 
becomes the basis of legally legitimate property, but there can also be sympathy when 
someone steals to feed their family, or when a Robin Hood type hero takes from those 
who have more than they need or who deprive others. In fairy stories, stealing from a 
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giant is particularly acceptable, perhaps because folk tales originate with people 
facing their giant masters. Hence, the ‘good thief’ is an archetype we cannot ignore, 
however much it aggravates those with property.
What counts as bad piracy depends on the current politics. Pirates like Francis 
Drake and Walter Raleigh were much praised in England. They received State 
sponsorship in reaction to the Spanish theft of gold and silver from South America; 
and the pirated gold was more productively used in Britain than in Spain. Piracy was 
an important part of the American Revolution, promoting attacks on the Royal Navy 
by melding patriotism with commercial gain (Patton 2008). After Independence the 
US thrived on pirated goods and intellectual property (Ben-Atar 2004); there was no 
protection given to the books of foreigners manufactured outside the US until 1986 
(Choate 2005: 41). Hollywood was founded in an attempt to escape Edison’s patents 
by shifting to the other side of the continent (Lessig 2005: 53-4). Today, rising 
powers such as China also maintain a lax attitude to protecting foreigners’ IP for the 
sake of their own economic development. The imaginings used to establish 
boundaries between property and theft are disputed and depend on relations of power 
and capability. Nevertheless, we should not forget that many pirates have gained 
profit out of murder, terror and slavery. 
There is, then, a piracy of the relatively weak and of the relatively strong. Piracy 
of the relatively weak occurs when markets are restricted, or the equity of ‘normal 
exchange’ is violated; whether by ‘corrupt’ class structures, or through what appears 
to be artificial restriction of goods. Such piracy is often a reaction to perceived 
illegitimate and excessive profits, or occurs when people revert to hunter-gatherer 
modes of exchange and control, seizing back property they do not believe belongs 
exclusively to another. Piracy further occurs when the labour and risk involved in 
theft are minimal in comparison to the profit or enhanced opportunities.
Piracy is ambiguous, and imagining file-sharing as ‘piracy,’ and situating it 
within an exciting and sometimes approved good-thief activity, might have 
diminished the legitimacy of corporate prosecution. Nowadays, corporations tend to 
metaphorise file-sharing as a ‘criminal’ activity hurting not only admired ‘celebrity 
stars’ but also the economy, while file-sharers still use the metaphor of ‘pirate’ as 
with The Pirate Bay and the various parliamentary pirate parties.
Intellectual Property in the Information Society.
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As we have argued, copying, sharing, transforming, elaborating, commenting, 
building and innovation are embedded within cultural production. Sociologist 
Maurizio Lazzarato (1996: np, italics in original) argues that in the information 
society commodity property is constituted ‘in forms that are immediately collective,’ 
existing ‘only in the form of networks and flows’. Furthermore the foundations of this 
property is blurred as:
the activity that produces the ‘cultural content’ of the commodity… 
involves activities… not normally recognized as ‘work’ [such as] defining 
and fixing cultural and artistic standards, fashions, tastes, consumer 
norms, and, more strategically, public opinion (ibid.).
Similarly Rasmus Fleischer (musician and founder of the Swedish anti-
copyright think tank Piratbyrån) and Palle Torsson (artist and Piratbyrån associate) 
argue, sharing ‘is not optional but inscribed in the technique we use every day’ 
(Fleischer & Torsson 2005).
However, while information capitalism demands free circulation of information 
to allow the production of ‘new’ ideas and cultural works, it simultaneously must stop 
ideas from circulating freely so as to profit from them. This produces incoherency. 
The more ideas are copyrighted, the less a person can imagine freely without 
trespassing on another’s property rights. Paradoxically for example, by putting a 
financial cost on sampling in music, fewer samples can be used in a new song, 
making it more derivative of its sources and thus less original. 
Culture has become restricted by property rights, while at the same time, the 
skills and tools necessary for successful information/cultural labour are not confined 
to the working day, as in industrial capitalism, but spill out into cultural and personal 
life in general. Retaining familiarity with current culture can be vital for a worker’s 
employment, future creativity and social self-identity. Similarly, capitalists gridlocked 
by patents (cf. Heller 2008), might even welcome sharing if they were not dependent 
upon such enclosures and boundaries for profit. 
P2P file-sharing systems illustrate the ambiguities of sharing, theft and cultural 
value (as appropriation, identity and creativity) in information society. Although it is 
often treated as piratical, file-sharing can be a legitimate gifting of public domain 
material or of a person’s own work. This ‘normal exchange’ was the way ideas 
leading to the construction of the internet were developed, and led Tim Berners-Lee to 
develop and gift HTML and the graphical interface system of the World Wide Web to 
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the world (Berners-Lee 1999). It is part of what made the early Web so attractive to 
non-specialist users. However, almost from its outset some wanted to ‘commercialise 
the internet’, and make it corporate rather than common property, eventually 
spawning the ‘venture capitalist’s paradise’ of Web 2.0 in which mass users provide 
the creative labour and content which has generated stratospheric profits for an elite in 
a piracy of the strong (Kleiner 2010:15). While users might provide the property 
voluntarily, it is doubtful that they have formally given permission for profit to be 
seized from their labour or even comprehended that their labour is being monetised 
for the benefit of others.  
In general, files available via P2P sites are usually ‘cultural products’ which are 
owned by content industry bodies who have either financed their production or been 
assigned the copyrights. Comments on P2P forums reveal that many P2P users 
dispute the legal and social assumption that content owners have greater rights than 
either the original (often exploited) creators or those who desire to participate freely 
in cultural exchange. This ‘injustice’ is partially remedied by ‘piracy’. 
Information piracy is also tied to modes of consumption, becoming easier with 
the high bandwidth that enables online gaming, video streaming, and legitimate 
downloads. Thus piracy is caught up in the very process of providing new ways for 
people to consume. Internet Service Providers (ISPs) may find file-sharing a 
profitable driver of the generous download plans they offer customers. Attempting to 
prevent piracy cuts into their own profits in order to defend someone else’s. Hence 
many ISPs resist the attempts of the Media businesses to use the State to enforce 
media favourable ownership rules, to constrain the activities of their customers, 
sometimes proposing solutions to the ‘problem’ that allow them to carry on business 
as usual (see, for example, iiNet 2011; Lasar 2011). 
Peer-to-peer (P2P): Property, Culture, Metaphor and Control
P2P
P2P refers to the suite of software programs, protocols and social practices that enable 
this form of online digital exchange. The P2P phenomenon depends on ‘normal 
exchange’; free software conventions, volunteer labour and a collective desire for 
access to cultural materials unfettered by hardware and software locks, copyright 
restrictions and other forms of enclosure. 
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P2P also disrupts itself in many ways. Instead of a ‘network society’ P2P fosters 
a ‘swarm society’ with some unusual features and vulnerabilities. Swarms form 
temporarily and disintegrate without forming ongoing networks, and people cultivate 
anonymity. Members display they are there, but do not know on whom they depend. 
Contact is contingent on the exchange, but may become more stable in the forums 
attached to particular sites.
As a result, file-sharing seems affected by the ‘tragedy of the commons’ 
argument, that free systems collapse because some people take advantage of them 
when the means of social control is not strong enough to prevent this. People might 
take files but not make them available, because they have inadequate storage space, 
bandwidth, or interest. Such people may be scorned, but the relationships are not 
strong enough to alter behaviour, although many semi-private and private sites insist 
upon fair download/upload ratios and suspend privileges of non-compliant members. 
Nevertheless, the majority of file-sharers use public trackers with no such controls, 
and therefore sociality among P2P participants tends to be relatively weak, and liable 
to fracture. 
Such conflict and incoherence is also implied by Cox, Collins and Drinkwater’s 
(2010) study comparing the attitudes of Finnish file-sharers who uploaded original 
copies of files (‘first-seeders’) with those who either downloaded them and continued 
to seed (‘seeders’), and those who did not reseed (‘leechers’). They discovered that 
leechers were much more likely to believe that ‘legal blame’ should fall exclusively 
‘upon the shoulders of seeders’. In contrast, first-seeders and seeders believed that ‘no 
individual or group should be legally liable for file-sharing activity’. As leeching 
would be impossible without the labour and risks undertaken by first-seeders, it may 
seem surprising that ‘leechers’ would be so harsh on them, yet this common attitude 
evidences the fractured ties amongst members of ephemeral swarms. 
P2P is also parasitic on other systems for its survival and the survival of its 
users. As Andersson (2006) writes, this peer labour ‘is dependent on already 
established prosperity; it is a form of “free” labour which one can afford, given that 
one has got the required material setup as well as the time, skill, and intellectual 
capacities’. P2P may also undermine the payment of those who use it to produce 
culture, by making their, or other, work available for free, thus undermining users’ 
prosperity and ability to participate. 
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P2P has also birthed a burgeoning field of ‘anti-piracy enterprise’, as Ramon 
Lobato and Julian Thomas (2011: 4) point out. These enterprises are diverse, 
including developers of Digital Rights Management (DRM) technologies like Audible 
Magic, internet traffic analysis firms like Sandvine, and cease-and-desist notice 
senders MediaSentry and DtecNet (ibid. 8, 10, 13). These organisations all ostensibly 
seek to ‘prevent, measure, transform, and otherwise derive revenue from copyright 
infringement’ (ibid. 4). However, as their business models depend upon the 
continuance of piracy, total prevention would equate with their commercial failure. 
This leads to ongoing manufacture of alarm, diversification of their client base and 
development of technologies which ‘monetize, rather than merely obstruct, 
infringement’, a method followed by both Google and YouTube (ibid. 10). 
P2P also faces problems around the failure of indexing, and ongoing sabotage 
via promulgation of broken files or the insertion of viruses into files. Companies such 
as Anti-Piracy LLC, Overpeer, Nuke Pirates, C-Right, and Media Defender specialise 
in such digital ‘spoofing’ and ‘spoiling’, aiming to drive ‘would-be pirates’ to legal 
services (Lobato & Thomas 2011: 9). As a result, irritation, disruption and paranoia 
become a magnified part of swarm sociality.
Sometimes file-sharing platforms vanish due to legal challenges arising because 
the software is too attractive – as was the case with the early centralised file-sharing 
system Napster. However, Napster’s legal (and later commercial) failure encouraged 
further inventiveness by hackers and users. In this case leading to the development of 
the BitTorrent protocol enabling fully-distributed file-sharing systems which share 
bandwidth and file chunks amongst a network of participants, none of whom know 
which chunks they are transmitting at any one moment (Bridy 2011). These files are 
linked by indices (or ‘torrents’) stored on computer servers such as the Swedish 
initiative The Pirate Bay (TPB). 
Significantly, TPB does not store any of the artefact data, only the metadata 
(keys) to locate it elsewhere.3 As each peer receives a packet of data onto their own 
computer, this data is available to be automatically seeded to any other peer connected 
3 In February 2012 TPB shifted from indexing torrents to providing ‘magnet’ links, a system which 
provides users with a ‘decentralized way’ of requesting a file rather than using a ‘centralized torrent 
server to connect the user with another peer’ (Geuss 2012). The shift was made for ‘survival’ reasons, 
as the smaller magnet files significantly reduce server space, allowing ‘copies of The Pirate Bay site’ to 
be made more easily should anti-piracy laws shut it down without warning. 
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to the same swarm; in effect downloaders must become uploaders to continue the 
exchange, at least until they have acquired a complete copy of the file. 
Nevertheless, far from retreating from disputes over property by claiming 
innocent neutrality TPB has taken a ‘strategic’ position in the global ‘copyfight’ 
(Andersson 2009). The ‘politicisation’ of file-sharing in Sweden, as exemplified by 
people’s participation in the advocacy organisation Piratbyrån and the political party 
Piratpartiet, has been directly attributed to the criminalisation of the activity by the 
media industry. Under this pressure, the Swedish ‘cyberpirate’ metamorphosed into a 
‘political partisan’, and their discourse expanded from that of ‘law and copyright’, to 
broader questions of ‘politics and participatory culture’ (Dahlberg 2011: 273). 
The Pirate Bay 
The Pirate Bay (TPB) was launched in November 2003. In 2008 The Pirate Bay’s 
four founders were charged with copyright infringement offences. The ensuing trial 
found them guilty, and imposed punitive fines (of about US$3.6 million) and a year’s 
jail time for each. On appeal, jail terms were reduced but the fines increased. Three of 
the defendants subsequently signalled their intention to appeal to the Supreme Court, 
and in October 2011 Sweden’s Prosecutor General recommended that this final appeal 
be denied because problems in The Pirate Bay case were ‘so complex’ the country’s 
highest court ‘might not be the appropriate venue to tackle them’ (enigmax 2011); an 
unusual argument about the capacity of the courts. The case concluded on 1 February 
2012 when the Supreme Court refused to hear the appeal motion, and consequently 
the founders’existing jail sentences and fines are final (Anderson 2012). However, 
this outcome does not appear to affect the site’s capacity to continue operating as 
normal, as according to its blog it moved to the .SE domain, thereby giving some 
breathing space from the legal reach of the ‘United States of Arrogance’ (The Pirate 
Bay 2012). Moreover, it appears that TPB was sold some years earlier (in mysterious 
circumstances), and so is no longer under the control of the founders (Anderson 
2009).
Meanwhile TPB continues to flourish as the world’s largest public torrent 
tracker. According to the statistics on the site’s front page in December 2011, TPB 
hosts ‘32.119.444 peers (22.961.788 seeders + 9.157.656 leechers) in 4.053.530 
torrents’ (The Pirate Bay 2011b). It was also ranked as the 86th most popular website 
in the world by Alexa Internet (2011) in mid-August 2011.
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TPB has close ties to the Piratpartiet (Pirate Party), a political party which 
arose in late 2005 from the public support given a petition protesting against a 
proposed change in Swedish copyright laws which would criminalise downloading 
(Miegel and Olsson 2008: 208-9). The party’s announced core vision is ‘Shared 
culture,’ ‘Free knowledge’ and ‘Protection of privacy’, aims that have been broadly 
mirrored by pirate parties formed elsewhere. It claims that: 
Terrorists may attack the open society, but only governments can abolish 
it. The Pirate Party wants to prevent that from happening…. The official 
aim of the copyright system has always been to find a balance in order to 
promote culture being created and spread. Today that balance has been 
completely lost, to a point where the copyright laws severely restrict the 
very thing they are supposed to promote. The Pirate Party wants to restore 
the balance in the copyright legislation. All non-commercial copying and 
use should be completely free. File sharing and p2p networking should be 
encouraged rather than criminalized. Culture and knowledge are good 
things, that increase in value the more they are shared (Piratpartiet nd1).
The party is thus in favour of ‘normal cultural exchange’ as defined earlier.
In 2009 the Piratpartiet won two seats in the EU parliament (Schofield 2009). 
This signalled that the contest over knowledge and property was no longer a fringe 
matter, nor a subject to be framed only by corporate financial interests. Piratpartiet’s 
precedent-setting success, not only in the European Parliament but in the wider sphere 
of public discourse, is in part due to the party’s deep interconnections with other 
localised ‘strategic, politicised entities’ such as the ‘propaganda institute, think-tank 
and alternative news agency’ Piratbyrån (the Pirate Bureau) and TPB (Andersson 
2010: 196). TPB itself was founded by Piratbyrån but soon claimed autonomy.
As well as restricting circulation of ideas, copyright can also be used to suppress 
discussion about property. One company not only threatened The Pirate Bay for 
violating the copyright of their clients but also threatened the TPB with copyright 
suits if they made the contents of that threatening email public (Jgela1 2005). 
Undeterred, TPB continued to publish a cache of such documents, and their own 
replies, on their website, declaring that ‘0 torrents has been removed, and 0 torrents 
will ever be removed’ (The Pirate Bay 2011a). A TPB response to Dreamworks in 
2004 is typical of their approach.
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As you may or may not be aware, Sweden is not a state in the United 
States of America. Sweden is a country in northern Europe. Unless you 
figured it out by now, US law does not apply here. For your information, 
no Swedish law is being violated.... It is the opinion of us and our lawyers 
that you are morons, and that you should please go sodomize yourself 
with retractable batons (ibid.)
Such ‘caustic, sarcastic’ letters might even help convince the court that TPB 
demonstrated enough ‘subjective intent’ to be held liable for copyright infringement 
(Carrier 2010: 12), again foregrounding the role of imagination in the construction of 
property and theft.
During the course of The Pirate Bay trial, metaphors were used to define and 
bound property. The core defence argument was that The Pirate Bay was a search 
engine like Google and thus subject to the same protections as Google. Defence 
lawyers claimed that in providing a service, which could be used both legally and 
illegally, TPB was not breaking the law, any more than manufacturers of cars which 
could break speed limits were breaking the law. They referred to ‘safe harbour’ 
protections entrenched in laws around the world, arguing that:
EU directive 2000/31/EC says that he who provides an information 
service is not responsible for the information that is being transferred. In 
order to be responsible, the service provider must initiate the transfer. But 
the admins of The Pirate Bay don’t initiate transfers. It’s the users that do 
and they are physically identifiable people. They call themselves names 
like King Kong... According to legal procedure, the accusations must be 
against an individual and there must be a close tie between the 
perpetrators of a crime and those who are assisting (enigmax 2009).
The prosecution argued that The Pirate Bay assisted the commission of a crime 
and that, according to Sweden’s Supreme Court, a person holding the jacket of 
someone committing battery can be held responsible for the battery. It was alleged 
that The Pirate Bay was gaining income from criminal activities via advertising and 
that it was negatively affecting industry. The court rejected the defence’s argument 
saying that the defendants knew the site was being used for illegal activities and they 
did nothing to prevent it; they were found to be accessories, to a crime that was not 
proven (Lewan 2009). As said previously, both sides appealed the result.
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As Hume implies, whether we accept the argument of prosecution or defence 
depends to a large extent on pre-existing alliance or on whether we are prepared to 
accept the metaphors describing The Pirate Bay as an innocent search engine, as a 
mugger, or as holding the coat of a mugger. 
Other metaphors came into play. Malin Littorin-Ferm, organiser of pro-Pirate 
Bay protests said ‘we young people have a whole platform on the Internet, where we 
have all our social contacts – it is there that we live. The state is trying to control the 
Internet and, by extension, our private lives’ (UPI 2009). This if anything shows the 
ways that private and public have changed and how that affects contests over 
property. The argument of the protesters again depends upon us seeing people’s 
activities at The Pirate Bay as a routine and essential part of social-cultural life. From 
a different everyday perspective, Paul McCartney, whose music returned over 300 
results on a recent TPB search, said ‘If you get on a bus you’ve got to pay. And I 
think it’s fair, you should pay your ticket’ (McKenzie & Cochrane 2009). His 
metaphor ‘forgets’ that some places do have free buses.
The vagueness of boundaries of violation arose when one of the prosecuting 
organisations demanded that ISPs not connect to The Pirate Bay. A lawyer for Telia 
Sonara, a communications company, said: 
In part, this is not a legally binding decision, but above all, this is a 
judgement against Pirate Bay and nothing that effects any service 
provider. We will not take any action (to block) the contents if we are not 
compelled to do so.
And the managing director of another company said ‘We will not censor sites for our 
customers; that is not our job’ (TT 2009).
Debates over the correct imagining of intellectual property continued on public 
websites. This is not just a matter for academics, lawyers or copyright holders, it is an 
imagining or seeking of metaphors that goes wherever people are concerned about 
property relations and the foundations can never be settled. Rather than seeing these a 
logical arguments, let us see them instead as metaphors of property and understand 
how unstable property imaginings are. Significantly, in spite of the rapidly shifting 
technological, legal, and social circumstances enveloping file-sharing, the range of 
metaphors remains relatively stable over time. One person wrote: 
This is like prosecuting the postal service, there is a great deal of criminal 
activity via the post, however are they on trial here? they are a medium of 
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communication nothing else, it is not up to the Post Office nor service 
providers to police IPR [intellectual property rights] infringements!
Others complained that industry was not taking advantage of the new technology and 
the court’s decision was (metaphorically) like legislating to preserve steam trains at 
the expense of other transport. Another compared P2P to walking into your local 
supermarket and shoplifting DVDs. Others objected to this metaphor because of the 
difference between scarce and infinite resources, or because if a friend gave you a 
copy of a DVD almost nobody would think that was theft. One person wondered if 
movies should be able to make as much money as they sometimes do in a world with 
real poverty. In response another said that pirating could destroy small film producers, 
who made almost no money (Comments on TT 2009). Others argued that while the 
cost of manufacture of CDs had decreased the price had not, so corporations thieved 
from the public, and that P2P was like listening to a radio station (Comments on 
Landes 2009a). Others continued arguments that the corporations were supporting 
dead technology, that:
The major labels could have charged for P2P transfers for the last decade. 
Instead, they demonised the technology, tried to bully their customers 
unsuccessfully and left all that money on the table. But that ship has 
sailed. 
The losses corporations were claiming from piracy were compared to speculation or 
fortune-telling, and it was alleged that mainstream companies destroyed local cultural 
production and thus should receive no sympathy (Comments on Landes 2009b). This 
diversity of metaphor also displays the ways that property becomes a mode of 
comparison, rather than a thing in itself.
Failed Control
Industry-commissioned P2P traffic figures show that attempts to curb mass file-
sharing by bringing civil and criminal actions against entities and users have failed. 
The Technical report: an Estimate of Infringing Use of the Internet by anti-
counterfeiting and piracy company Envisional estimated that 23.76% of global 
internet traffic was ‘infringing’ (2011: 2). Moreover, it estimated that BitTorrent (BT) 
traffic accounted for 17.9% of all internet traffic, two-thirds of which was deemed to 
be ‘non-pornographic copyrighted content shared illegitimately’ (ibid.). At any time 
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over 8 million people could be exchanging files using the BT protocol, out of a pool 
of 100 million regular users worldwide (ibid. 4). 
If these figures are more or less accurate then social norms are not changing in 
response to legal action and spectacular trials, demonstrating Hume’s proposition that 
property belongs to the realm of the imagination. Millions of otherwise relatively law-
abiding people are regularly downloading cultural content, implying that they do not 
imagine their acts as criminal, or reasonably disapproved of. Instead, they imagine 
cultural artefacts as the property of no-one, or of everyone, as in ‘normal exchange’. 
Moreover, the experience of being in a swarm, especially one associated with a 
widely used public tracker such as TPB, can assuage an individual’s apprehensiveness 
about personal risk. As regular TorrentFreak commenter Violator0 (ernesto 2011) 
noted, ‘Like wildebeest crossing the river only a few will be taken down and eaten by 
the crocodiles. Doing the same in small groups leads to a much higher percentage of 
death so the larger your swarm the better’. 
Faced with this disobedient multitude, and difficulties with different laws in 
different countries, powerful industry/State alliances have attempted to preserve and 
extend capitalist profit and property by intensifying copyright legislation in national 
jurisdictions around the world, developing multilateral treaties to expand copyrights 
and decrease fair and previously normal usages. This is an example of ‘piracy of the 
strong’. Signatories to the most powerful of these treaties, the Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement (ACTA), must agree to change existing sovereign law to comply 
with ACTA’s ‘harmonisation’ goals. Although ACTA’s early drafts were kept 
private, leaks inevitably occurred. Consequently the final draft was considerably 
watered down due to highly organised lobbying by groups such as La Quadrature du 
Net (2010) and Knowledge Ecology International (2011), and the growing 
involvement of political pirate parties. Responding to the transnational piracy of the 
strong we have a transnational ‘piracy of the weak’ who combine their understanding 
of contemporary social desires and cultural mores with cooperative, agile use of 
networks, metaphor and creative expressions to fight what they deem to be corporate 
theft. Organisation provokes counter-organisation to disorder it, and vice versa.
Even when passed, attempts to create obedient consumers are unstable. For 
instance, Hadopi, the French government agency charged with administering the 
country’s anti-file-sharing laws, is struggling with the sheer amount of digital 
property ‘crime’. In July 2011 it reported it was unable to keep up with the 8 million 
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complaints it had received from the internet security company MediaSentry; 
processing only 470,000 initial warning e-mails, 20,000 second notices, and 10 third-
strike notifications which require a judge to approve a temporary internet suspension 
and/or fine (Lee 2011). Enforcement is being overwhelmed by the theft the new 
legislation manufactures.
Conclusion
Although property can form, or contribute, a basis for social order it has no logical or 
inevitable basis in itself. We have suggested that throughout most of human evolution, 
property has been circulated not accumulated; existing so as to build relationships, be 
consumed, gain status and make culture. Class structures arise when these ‘normal’ 
human modes of exchange are circumvented. Accumulated ‘private’ property, 
although bringing some security, potentially clashes with ‘normal exchange’ and is a 
product of a history of appropriation and competing imaginings; it emerges out of a 
web of relationships and prior production, appropriation and distribution, and it. As a 
result, property ownership always has boundary problems, and extracting it from this 
web becomes political; a matter of imaginal representation, metaphor, rhetoric, and 
the use of power. Theft is itself ambivalent, with the common idea of the good thief, 
taking property from those who either do not need it or who are unworthy of it. The 
‘good’ pirate can also be part of a means of prosperity recognised by the State. In this 
chapter we distinguished between the piracy of the relatively weak and the relatively 
strong.  The strong tend to legitimate themselves in law and attempt to prevent piracy 
of the weak. What counts as legitimate property and what as theft is a matter of 
metaphor, opinion and power.
At the moment, in information capitalism, corporations attempt to resolve the 
ambiguities around property by restricting the use of ideas and symbols through 
police, courts, fines, political pressure, implicit violence and imprisonment. They also 
seek to extend their property ‘rights’ even further into the realm of ideas, culture and 
self-expression, thus thieving more and more from culture generally. What was once 
partially common becomes limited. This ‘piracy of the strong’ generates social 
disruption, as sharing, copying and transformation are vital imaginative, creative and 
relationship-building processes. Culture and cultural ‘advancement’ cannot exist 
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without them. As people and corporations need to communicate, borrow and ‘steal’ to 
make culture and property, so turning all information into property cuts people off 
from normal cultural and commercial production, and thus they have an incentive to 
rebel. Extension of property is theft, and manufactures theft. Manufacture of theft 
threatens more property, even though without some ownership of property the people 
thieving could not survive on their own artistic and cultural labour and productions. 
Thus the system is unstable. 
In The Pirate Bay trial, the comments on the trial, and in the actions of the 
Piratpartiet we can see the playout of different types of power (political, national, 
legal, corporate) and the irresolvable metaphors which are used to justify theft and 
property, and the vagueness bordering those two categories. Metaphorically, there 
may be huge or no difference between P2P and listening to a radio or a friend’s CDs 
and then deciding what to buy. P2P can attack social fundamentals, while attacking 
P2P can also be an attack on social fundamentals. Attempting to suppress P2P can be 
an attempt by people who made money out of a technology, to halt a new technology 
of cultural exchange and production that threatens that ability, through institutions 
which express the power of those old relationships, or it can be an attempt to preserve 
order and allow cultural producers to survive. The questions of what is theft and what 
is property, revolve around the question of whether culture and ideas should be 
shared, rented or restricted.
It is, however, difficult to resist theft of any kind and rebellion is not easy. The 
piracy of the weak is enabled by the very mechanisms which attempt to distribute 
culture as property, and regulate theft by the weak. P2P occurs because of the network 
of relationships established by the information economy, and may not survive without 
them. As well, the social forms that develop around P2P are swarm-like, and gain 
little internal social or moral coherence and organisation. These movements also seem 
parasitic on a successful information property regime (ie one which supports 
producers, and provides the money which allows the swarm to live), so they 
undermine what they need to survive.  Perhaps moving offline and forming 
organisations like the Piratpartiet allows the possibility of sustained impact.  
French anarchists Comité Invisible have proposed that radical social 
restructuring could be generated via a web of self-organised experimental communes 
which would not ‘occupy’ the territory but become the territory, as ‘[e]very practice 
brings a territory into existence’ (The Invisible Committee 2009: 108). Such a 
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movement would abandon identity politics and pursue what we have implied is the 
variable visibility of the swarm; turning a socially-enforced anonymity to advantage, 
through ‘conspiracy, nocturnal or faceless actions, creating an invulnerable position of 
attack’ (113). This could be happening spontaneously in P2P activities, but there is no 
widespread revolutionary purity, and the problems with property, and P2P’s 
dependence on information capitalism, cannot be resolved easily; they arise from the 
inevitable incoherencies generated by property and social life and upon which social 
life and property depend. 
We live with uncertainty and mess, with no ultimate coherence, only struggle: 
only the paradox that property and theft are interconnected, and attempts to regulate 
property in the information society can undermine the very social functions of the 
property that allow it to operate. Attempts to give coherence are just comforting 
illusions whose failure becomes almost instantly apparent by the counter-measures 
which spring up.
At the moment capitalist information society is saved by the inertia of wealth 
and power, and the fact that not everything is information. The irreducible basics of 
water, food, power, shelter and clothing still have to be bought, grown or extracted 
from the earth – and this may become more precarious as environments degrade. On 
this parasitic basis, all other aspects of information property, both ‘piratical’ and 
‘legitimate’, depend – and without recognising this dependence they can all face 
destruction.
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